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During a lawful search, a police officer may inadvertently discover
incriminating evidence which is not the intended object of his search.
The plain view exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment allows the officer to make a warrantless seizure of his
unexpected find.' The scope of the plain view exception has been care-
fully delineated by the United States Supreme Court.2 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, however, has on occasion disregarded the
Supreme Court's guidance.3 The result is an Oklahoma plain view ex-
ception which allows unconstitutional intrusions upon privacy.4
This Comment examines the two leading Oklahoma plain view
opinions against the background of plain view doctrine developed by
the United States Supreme Court. Disparities between the Oklahoma
plain view exception and its federal counterpart are analyzed and a
method for resolving those disparities is suggested.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Background
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution consists
of two clauses: the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause.5 The
reasonableness clause provides that "the right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. '' 6 The warrant clause pro-
1. "The 'plain view' exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement permits a law
enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discov-
ered in a place where the officer has a right to be." Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1982).
2. See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971).
3. See, eg., Phelps v. State, 598 P.2d 254, 262 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (Bussey, J., dissent-
ing); Clayton v. State, 555 P.2d 1310 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
4. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 132-40.
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment has been substantially incorporated into
the Oklahoma Constitution as art. II, § 30.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV, cl. I.
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vides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."7 The juxtaposi-
tion of the two clauses has been construed as an indication that the
drafters of the fourth amendment intended to outlaw all searches and
seizures conducted without a warrant." The searches and seizures pro-
hibited by the reasonableness clause are those searches and seizures
undertaken without a warrant that meet the requirements of the war-
rant clause. 9
Although a general warrant requirement for search and seizure
has emerged as the law of the land, it has not served as an absolute bar
to warrantless searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that there exist "exceptional circumstances in which, on balanc-
ing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy,
it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dis-
pensed with."'" The Court has not been without sympathy for the po-
7. Id cl. 2.
8. Justice Frankfurter explained the relationship of the two clauses in United States v. Rabi-
nowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950):
When the Fourth Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches" and then went on to
define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate
could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is
unreasonable unless a warrant authorizes it.
Id at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). But this explanation has not won unanimous approval.
One commentator has argued that "Justice Frankfurter, and others who have viewed the fourth
amendment primarily as a requirement that searches be covered by warrants, have stood the
amendment on its head. Such was not the history of the matter. ... T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 46-47 (1969). According to Taylor, the framers, as men of
the eighteenth century, were primarily concerned with the dangers of "overreaching" warrants, id.
at 41, and "were not at all concerned about searches without warrants," id at 43. Justice Rehn-
quist recently took note of this debate and the futility of attacking the Frankfurter view: "There is
significant historical evidence that we have over the years misread the history of the Fourth
Amendment. . . . But one may accept all of that as stare decisis. ... Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 621 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) ("[A] search or seizure carried
out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable. ... ); accord Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); cf. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) ("es-
sential purpose of the Fourth Amendment [is] to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions
into his privacy").
10. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496,
505 (1973) ("Where there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be 'now
or never' to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior
judicial evaluation."); see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) ("Only in exigent circum-
stances will thejudgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a
search."); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) ("Search warrants are ordinarily re-
quired for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be required where intru-
sions into the human body are concerned."); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948)
("A search without a warrant demands exceptional circumstances. ... ).
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lice officer who finds himself in an emergency in which he must either
seize evidence without the benefit of a warrant or helplessly stand by
and watch the evidence destroyed.1 ' In the interest of effective law en-
forcement, the Court has recognized a limited number of specific ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement.' 2 However, the Court has been
scrupulously reluctant to recognize new exceptions."t As a result, un-
less the facts bring a case within the scope of one of the already recog-
nized exceptions, evidence resulting from a warrantless search or
seizure almost certainly will be ruled inadmissible.14 It would seem
that while there is more than one way to skin a cat, or to constitution-
ally seize evidence without a warrant, there are nonetheless a limited
number of ways to do so.
Given this state of fourth amendment law, the significance of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is manifest. They
represent a seemingly exhaustive list of factual circumstances under
which a police officer may constitutionally conduct a search or seize
evidence without a warrant. There are five principal established excep-
tions to the warrant requirement: 5 the search incident exception,' 6 the
stop and frisk exception,' 7 the vehicle exception,' 8 the hot pursuit ex-
11. The Court has held that police were justified in pursuing a fleeing suspect into her home
without a warrant where there was "a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruc-
tion of evidence." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976). Similarly, the Court has
upheld "no-knock" entries by police when the officers are searching for narcotics because such
contraband is "quickly and easily destroyed." Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963).
12. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
13. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1977) (refusing to extend vehicle exception
to include warrantless searches of movable containers); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-
59 (1967) (refusing to create new exception to the warrant requirement for electronic
eavesdropping).
14. "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, areperse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
(footnotes omitted); accord Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971).
15. Minor exceptions to the warrant requirement include the border search exception, see
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (authorized agents of the United States may
conduct routine searches of vehicles, baggage, and other personal effects at international borders
without probable cause); the inventory search exception, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 372 (1976) (police may conduct warrantless inventory searches of automobiles lawfully im-
pounded after abandonment); United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1288 (10th Cir. 1980)
(police may conduct warrantless inventory searches of automobiles lawfully impounded after the
vehicle was involved in illegal activity); the administrative search exception, see Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967) (routine warrantless health, safety, and fire inspections of
private dwellings held constitutional).
16. When making a valid arrest, the police may constitutionally conduct a warrantless search
of the arrestee's person as well as the area within the suspect's immediate control. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
17. When a police officer believes a suspect to be armed and dangerous, but does not have
3
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ception, t9 and the plain view exception.2°
B. The Early Plain View Decisions
The question of whether a search or seizure is reasonable presup-
poses the occurrence of a search or seizure. Often a court must decide
the threshold issue of whether any search or seizure-meaning any in-
trusion into an area of constitutionally protected privacy2 t'-has in fact
sufficient probable cause to justify an arrest, he may nevertheless conduct a search of the suspect's
outer clothing in an effort to discover weapons that might be used against him. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
18. Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
[T]he true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon prob-
able cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.
Id
19. In the presence of exigent circumstances, police officers may conduct a warrantless search
or seizure to prevent the destruction of evidence, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976),
or to protect either the police officers or the general public, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-
99 (1967). In both Santana and Hayden, the exigent circumstances resulted from police pursuit of
a suspect, hence the designation "hot pursuit" exception.
20. Evidence in plain view may be seized without a warrant when the plain view observation
results from a prior valid intrusion into a constitutionally protected area of privacy, the evidence is
discovered inadvertently, and the incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately apparent.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
21. This definition of a search reflects the modem view that a search need not entail a physi-
cal intrusion. This view was first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (plural-
ity opinion). In Katz, appellant was convicted for the interstate transmission of wagering
information. At his trial, the government was allowed to introduce "wiretap" evidence gathered
by means of an electronic listening device which the FBI had attached to the outside of a public
phone booth. Id at 348. The court of appeals rejected appellant's contention that the warrantless
surveillance was unconstitutional after it found that there was no physical intrusion into an area
occupied by appellant. Id at 348-49. In his plurality opinion, Justice Stewart lashed out at the
concept of the fourth amendment as merely the protector of spatially defined areas.
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.
Id at 351-52 (citations omitted). In a concurring opinion Justice Harlan restated the plurality's
holding regarding what objects are protected by the fourth amendment.
[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view"
of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against
being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be
unreasonable.
Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Under this abstract analysis, which would protect not only
tangible objects, but also activities, statements, and conversations, the Court held that the elec-
tronic surveillance at issue constituted a search and seizure. Id at 353. Predictably, Justice Black
recoiled from this theoretical approach to the fourth amendment. He characterized such opinions
as "broad policy discussions and philosophical discourses on such nebulous subjects as privacy."
4
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occurred. For example, in what generally is regarded as the first plain
view case,22 the United States Supreme Court held that no search or
seizure occurred when a Coast Guard patrol boat shined its searchlight
upon the deck of a ship at sea.23 In United States v. Lee, the searchlight
clearly revealed cases of liquor on the deck of the suspects' ship;24 sub-
sequently the boat was boarded and searched and its crew was arrested
for violation of the Tariff and Prohibition Acts.25 But the intrusion of
boarding was justified under the vehicle exception to the warrant re-
quirement.26 Because Lee concerns a plain view observation of evi-
dence made before a police intrusion, it is not actually a plain view
exception case. In this Comment, the rule of Lee-observation of evi-
dence in plain view does not by itself constitute a search-will be re-
ferred to as the doctrine of pre-intrusion plain view. The legal
principle drawn from the true plain view exception cases-plain view
observations made after a police intrusion-will be referred to as the
doctrine of post-intrusion plain view. This terminology should pre-
clude the application of pre-intrusion plain view law to post-intrusion
plain view facts.2 The difference between pre-intrusion and post-in-
trusion plain view is illustrated by a comparison of the facts of Lee and
the facts of the first true plain view exception case, Harris v. United
States .28
In Harris, appellant's car was impounded as part of an armed rob-
bery investigation. A local police regulation required the officer taking
possession of an impounded car to search the car thoroughly in order to
remove all valuables from it and to attach to the car a tag listing the
Id at 365 (Black, J., dissenting). According to Justice Black, there was no justification for "con-
struing the search and seizure amendment as applying to eavesdropping or the 'seizure' of conver-
sations." Id at 366-67.
22. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
23. But no search on the high seas is shown. The testimony of the boatswain shows that
he used a searchlight. It is not shown that there was any exploration below decks ....
Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is
not prohibited by the Constitution.
Id at 563.
24. "For aught that appears, the cases of liquor were on deck and ...were discovered
before the motor boat was boarded." Id
25. Id at 560-61.
26. "Under such circumstances, search and seizure of the vessel, and arrest of the persons
thereon, by the Coast Guard on the high seas is lawful, as like search and seizure of an automo-
bile, and arrest of the persons therein, by prohibition officers on land is lawful." Id at 563.
27. For a discussion of the misapplication of pre-intrusion plain view law, see infra text ac-
companying notes 127-31. One commentator has theorized that "[t]he phrase 'plain view'.. ,
continues to possess its chameleon-like quality because of its loose employment to describe...
visually similar but legally distinct situations." Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected
Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1047, 1100 (1975).
28. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
[Vol. 18:674
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circumstances of the impoundment.29 As the officer performed those
tasks, it began to rain. In order to roll up the windows, he opened one
of the car doors and discovered on the doorsill a registration card bear-
ing the robbery victim's name. He recognized the registration card as
incriminating evidence and seized it. The officer made the inventory
search of the car and seized the registration card without obtaining a
warrant.30 The trial court held the card admissible as evidence and
Harris appealed the ruling.31
The Court simplified the case by finding that the inventory search
had ended before the officer opened the door and discovered the regis-
tration card.32 That meant the discovery of the card was not a fruit of
the inventory search; the admissibility of the card as evidence did not
depend on the lawfulness of the inventory search.33 Instead, the Court
found that the discovery of the card was the result of a lawful intrusion
upon the suspect's privacy motivated solely by the officer's desire to
protect the interior of the car from the rain.34 Under this analysis, the
only issue before the Court was the lawfulness of the warrantless
seizure of the card after a valid intrusion had brought about its plain
view discovery.
Clearly, the pre-intrusion plain view doctrine was not applicable.
That doctrine dictates only that the observation of evidence in plain
view is not an intrusion upon the suspect's privacy. In Harris, no con-
tention was made that the plain view observation was an intrusion.
The issue of valid intrusion had been dispensed with by the Court's
finding that the officer had lawfully opened the door. In Lee, a pre-
intrusion plain view case, the plain view observation had preceded and
helped justify a subsequent intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area of privacy under the vehicle exception to the warrant require-
ment.35 In Harris, the officer made his plain view observation after the
intrusion had occurred; the plain view observation was the result of,
rather than the justification for, an intrusion upon the suspect's pri-
vacy.36 Furthermore, in Lee the warrantless seizure of evidence which
29. Id at 235.
30. id at 235-36.
31. Id at 234-35.
32. "[Tihe discovery of the card was not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure
taken to protect the car while it was in police custody." Id at 236.
33. The Court later upheld the constitutionality of warrantless inventory searches of im-
pounded vehicles in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1976).
34. See supra note 32.
35. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
36. 390 U.S. at 236.
1983]
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resulted from the intrusion into the constitutionally protected area of
privacy was justified under the vehicle exception to the warrant re-
quirement.37 In Harris, the Court did not consider the vehicle
exception.
Instead, the Harris Court held that after an officer has lawfully
intruded into a constitutionally protected area of privacy he may make
a warrantless seizure of any incriminating evidence inadvertently dis-
covered in plain view within that area.38  The Court thus established a
new exception to the warrant requirement, the plain view exception,
and expressed its first formulation of the doctrine of post-intrusion
plain view.3 9 Having lawfully intruded upon the suspect's privacy, the
police are not constitutionally obliged to blink at reality and ignore
evidence accidentally discovered in plain view.40
C. Coolidge v. New Hampshire: Formulation of the Doctrine
As the herald of a new exception to the warrant requirement, the
Harris opinion, less than three pages in length, was disappointingly
laconic. The Court's next plain view exception opinion, Frazier v.
Cupp, 4t was equally terse. In 1971, however, the Court announced its
decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire42 in an opinion that remains the
Court's most comprehensive analysis of post-intrusion plain view
law.43 The brevity of the Harris and Frazier opinions" effectively lim-
37. See supra note 26.
38. Once the door had been lawfiully opened, the registration card, with the name of the
robbery victim on it, was plainly visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in
the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.
390 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added).
39. Id
40. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971).
Where, once an otherwise lawful search is in progress, the police inadvertently come
upon a piece of evidence, [sic] it would often be a needless inconvenience, and sometimes
dangerous-4o the evidence or to the police themselves--to require them to ignore it
until they have obtained a warrant particularly describing it.
id
41. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). In Frazier, the police inadvertently discovered evidence incriminat-
ing the appellant while the officers lawfully searched a duffel bag during an investigation of the
appellant's cousin. The Court held that the evidence thus seized was admissible but gave no
explanation for its decision. "The officers therefore found evidence against petitioner in the
course of an otherwise lawful search. Under this Court's past decisions, they were clearly permit-
ted to seize it." Id at 740.
42. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
43. "Historical research reveals that [the plain view exception as a] doctrine, seems to have
sprung full-blown from [the] plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire in June, 1971. There
had been, to be sure, intimations but nothing resembling a body of doctrine." Moylan, supra note
20, at 1047 (citations omitted).
44. In each case, the Court's opinion was less than two pages in length and its legal analysis
was contained in a single paragraph.
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ited their applicability to their own facts. In contrast, the scholarly
thoroughness of Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Coolidge has ap-
parently guaranteed its acceptance as the law of the land45 though it
attracted the unreserved support of only four Court members.46
In Coolidge, the Court was asked to rule upon the validity of
search and arrest warrants issued by a state attorney general who had
participated in a murder investigation that culminated in the arrest of
Coolidge in his home and the seizure of his car as evidence under the
contested warrants.47 The plurality held that the warrants were with-
out legal effect because they were not issued by a "neutral and de-
tached magistrate. '48 Coolidge's car, seized under the faulty warrants,
had contained evidence critical to his murder conviction.49 Unless that
seizure was justified under one of the established exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, that critical evidence was inadmissible and Coo-
lidge's conviction would have to be overturned." According to the
state, the car was subject to a warrantless seizure under the plain view
exception because the police officers had observed the car in plain view
after they had lawfully entered Coolidge's land to arrest him.5' The
plurality found the state's argument unpersuasive. 2
At the very core of the plurality's approach to post-intrusion plain
view lies its concept of the importance of the warrant requirement as a
45. See Moylan, supra note 27, at 1049. ("Indeed, courts generally (perhaps uncritically)
seem to be treating.. . the Stewart opinion in Coolidge Y. New Hampshire as 'the law of the
land.' "); see also Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 327 n.a
(5th ed. 1980).
46. Justice Stewart's lengthy opinion is divided into three major parts. Part II deals with the
topic of warrantless search and seizure and is divided into four sections. Part II-C specifically
addresses the doctrine of the plain view exception. Justices Black and White filed separate opin-
ions dissenting to part II in its entirety. Part II-D is Justice Stewart's rebuttal to those dissenting
opinions and consists of an enthusiastic defense of some of the principles enunciated in part II-C.
403 U.S. at 453-84. Justices Burger, Black, White, and Blackmun dissented to both part II-C and
part II-D. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined Justice Stewart in both part II-C and
part II-D. Justice Harlan concurred in the result reached by the Stewart plurality but neither
concurred nor dissented in part II-C. However, in his separate opinion, Justice Harlan did concur
in part II-D. Id at 490-527. Hence an argument can be made that Justice Harlan's concurrence
in part II-D was in reality a begrudging fifth vote cast for Part II-C.
47. 403 U.S. at 446-47.
48. Id at 453.
49. Id at 447-48.
50. Id at 453.
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protection against police intrusions. The plurality postulates two pri-
mary objectives served by the warrant requirement. First, the warrant
requirement minimizes the number of police intrusions into constitu-
tionally protected areas of privacy by demanding that the police seek
an objective magistrate's permission to make intrusions whenever prac-
ticable. Second, the warrant requirement limits the scope of any neces-
sary police intrusion upon the individual's privacy by demanding that
warrants extend only to particularly described persons, places, and ob-
jects. 3 The plain view exception must not be applied, the plurality
reasons, when the results would conflict with the two objectives of the
warrant requirement.-4 Therefore, the proper application of the plain
view exception requires: (1) The plain view observation must follow a
prior valid intrusion, (2) it must be immediately apparent that the ob-
ject seized is evidence of a crime, and (3) the discovery must be
inadvertent.55
The first requirement for the proper application of the plain view
exception dictates that the plain view observation must follow, rather
than precede, a prior valid intrusion; the observation of evidence in
plain view can never, by itself, justify a subsequent warrantless intru-
sion into a constitutionally protected area of privacy.56 Hence the ap-
plication of the plain view exception does not increase the number of
police intrusions and the first objective of the warrant requirement-to
minimize the number of police intrusions-is not hindered.
The second requirement for the proper application of the plain
view exception demands that it must be immediately apparent that the
53. The rationale for the "plain view" exception is evident if we keep in mind the two
distinct constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement. First, the magis-
trate's scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause.
The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seizure is an evil, so that
no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior determination of necessity. . . .The
second, distinct objective is that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as
possible. Here, the specific evil is the "general warrant" abhorred by the colonists, and
the problem is not that of intrusionper se but of a general, explanatory [sic] rummaging
in a person's belongings.
403 U.S. at 467 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
54. "The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the statement of its rationale." Id at 468.
55. What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had aprior justfcationfor an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. . . . Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is irmedately apparent to thepolice that
they have evidence before them.
Id at 466 (emphasis added).
56. "[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Id at
468 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 18:674
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object in plain view is evidence of a crime. 57 The police are not permit-
ted to seize everything situated in plain view and sift through it at their
leisure to determine which objects actually are incriminating. This re-
quirement promotes the second objective of the warrant requirement-
to limit the scope of necessary police intrusions.
The third requirement, established by the Coolidge plurality, dic-
tates that the discovery of the evidence in plain view must be inadver-
tent.58 The police are not permitted to make a warrantless seizure of
evidence in plain view after they have intruded into a constitutionally
protected area of privacy knowing what they would "discover" inside.
Under the facts of Coolidge, the plurality found that the police had
entered Coolidge's land knowing that their entrance would afford them
a plain view of Coolidge's car. Consequently, the plain view exception
did not justify the warrantless seizure of the car, notwithstanding the
assumed lawfulness 59 of the police intrusion to arrest Coolidge.60 This
finding, however, is unnecessary in light of the plurality's own concept
of the protective functions of the warrant requirement. When the po-
lice are justified in making an intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
tected area of privacy-as the police were justified in entering onto
Coolidge's land to place him under arrest-they may take advantage of
that privilege and maneuver themselves into a plain view observation
without hindering either of the objectives of the warrant requirement.
Assuming, arguendo, that the police entered onto Coolidge's land to
arrest him and to make a plain view observation of his car, there still
was only one police intrusion. Furthermore, precisely because the po-
lice knew which object they wished to seize, the scope of that intrusion
was not widened; no broad rummaging search was conducted. As Jus-
tice White wrote in his dissent, "the inadvertence rule is unnecessary to
further any Fourth Amendment ends and will accomplish nothing."'"
57. "[T]he 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges." Id at 466.
58. Id at 469.
59. "We assume that the arrest of Coolidge inside his house was valid." Id at 455. Ten years
later, the Court reconsidered its assumption and held that, absent exigent circumstances, the police
need a warrant to arrest a suspect in his own home. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590
(1980).
60. In the light of what has been said, it is apparent that the "plain view" exception
cannot justify the police seizure of the Pontiac car in this case. The police had ample
opportunity to obtain a valid warrant; they knew the automobile's exact description and
location well in advance; they intended to seize it when they came upon Coolidge's
property.
403 U.S. at 472.
61. Id at 517 (white, J., dissenting).
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In fact, it was the establishment of the inadvertence requirement that
triggered all four dissenting votes in Coolidge. 2
The Court's next major plain view decision, Washington v. Chris-
man,63 was the product of a more united Court." Although the Chris-
man Court expressed itself in a more conservative voice,65  it
nevertheless showed a marked deference toward the doctrine of post-
intrusion plain view enunciated by the Coolidge plurality. By under-
taking the refinement of that doctrine, the Chrisman Court indicated its
own unwillingness to completely abandon it.
D. Washington v. Chrisman: The Doctrine Refned
In Chrisman, a campus police officer arrested Carl Overdahl as he
left a college dormitory carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. Overdahl
appeared to be under age and told the officer that his identification was
in his dormitory room. The officer allowed Overdahl to re-enter the
62. Justice White opposed "a condition that discovery of the disputed evidence be 'inadver-
tent,' "id at 516 (White, J., dissenting), and contended that the car was properly seized "whether
or not the officers expected that it would be found where it was," id at 522. Justice Black's dissent
is founded upon a belief that the Court should have resolved Coolidge as a search incident case,
see supra note 16, and therefore did not need to address the issue of the applicability of the plain
view exception. According to Justice Black, "the seizure of petitioner's automobile was valid
under the well-established right of the police to seize evidence in plain view at the time and place
of the arrest." Id at 505 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black then voiced his displeasure with the
inadvertence requirement in terms of the search incident exception. "Only rarely can it be said
that evidence seized incident to an arrest is truly unexpected or inadvertent. . . . It appears to me
that the rule adopted by the Court today, for all practical purposes, abolishes seizure incident to
arrest." Id at 509.
Inadvertence was the issue that split the Court with regard to the plain view exception. It is
worth noting that Justice Harlan's concurrence in part II-D of the plurality opinion evidenced his
support for the proposition that inadvertence is a requirement for valid warrantless seizures under
the plain view exception. Id at 491-92 (Harlan, J., concurring); see supra note 46. Part II-D spoke
expressly to the issue of inadvertence:
We are convinced that the result reached in this case is correct, and that the principle it
reflects--that the police must obtain a warrant when they intend to seize an object outside
the scope of a valid search incident to arrest--can be easily understood and applied by
courts and law enforcement officers alike.
Id at 484 (emphasis added).
63. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
64. Washington v. Chrisman was a 6-3 decision. Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehn-
quist, Stevens, and O'Connor made up the majority. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dis-
sented. Id
65. During the ten years between Coolidge and Chrisman, two of the four members of the
Coolidge plurality were succeeded by more conservative Justices. Justice Douglas was succeeded
by Justice Stevens in 1975; Justice Stewart by Justice O'Connor in 1981. Justice Harlan, whose
separate concurrence in Coolidge had proved the deciding vote, see supra notes 46 & 62, was
succeeded by the present Court's most conservative member, Justice Rehnquist, in 1972. With
this change in the make-up of the Court, it is not surprising that the Chrisman opinion embodies
an attitude more sympathetic to the plight of the police officer and less protective of the fourth
amendment rights of the accused.
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dormitory to retrieve his identification but accompanied him inside.
Neil Chrisman, Overdah's roommate, was in the dormitory room
when Overdahl and the police officer arrived. The officer stationed
himself in the doorway of the room and watched Overdahi's and Chris-
man's movements inside the room. Chrisman appeared nervous at the
sight of a police officer.66 From the doorway, the officer noticed seeds
and a small seashell pipe lying on a desk inside the room. Believing the
seeds to be marijuana, the officer entered the room, seized the seeds
and pipe, and arrested Chrisman and Overdahl. 67 They were subse-
quently charged with possession of controlled substances. A pretrial
motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room was denied and
Overdahl and Chrisman were convicted. 68 Their convictions were af-
firmed at the intermediate appellate level,69 but the Supreme Court of
Washington reversed.7" The state appealed and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 '
Under a Coolidge analysis, the observation of evidence in plain
view, by itself, cannot justify a subsequent warrantless intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area of privacy; the intrusion must precede
the plain view observation.72 In Chrisman, the officer testified that he
entered the dormitory room with the sole purpose of seizing the pipe
and seeds after he observed them from the doorway.73 The plain view
observation had preceded the intrusion and therefore the plain view
exception seemingly was inapplicable. But the Chrisman Court held
that the intrusion preceded the plain view observation74 and upheld the
warrantless seizure of the pipe and seeds under the plain view excep-
tion.75 To reach this conclusion, the Court had to give a new gloss to
the term "intrusion."
The Court reasoned that from the moment the campus police of-
ficer stopped Overdahl outside the dormitory he had the right to ac-
company him into constitutionally protected areas of privacy to keep
66. 455 U.S. at 3.
67. Following their arrest, Chrisman and Overdahl voluntarily produced a box containing
marijuana and handed it to the officer. They also consented to a search of the room which dis-
closed more marijuana and a quantity of LSD. Id at 4.
68. Id
69. 24 Wash. App. 385, 600 P.2d 1316 (1979).
70. 94 Wash. 2d 711, 619 P.2d 971 (1980).
71. 452 U.S. 959 (1981).
72. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467-68; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
73. 455 U.S. at 10 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
74. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
75. 455 U.S. at 9.
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the arrestee under surveillance.76 Therefore, when Overdahl entered
the dormitory room to retrieve his identification, he unknowingly be-
stowed upon the officer the right to enter the room. The intrusion oc-
curred when the officer was granted the right to enter. The Court
viewed an intrusion as a matter of a legal right rather than a matter of
physical encroachment. 7 The intrusion occurred when the officer was
granted the right to enter, not when he exercised that right and left the
doorway to seize the pipe and seeds.78 Applying this definition of intru-
sion to the facts of Chrisman, the plain view observation of the pipe
and seeds occurred after Overdahl entered the room and, thus, after the
police intrusion. Having redefined the term "intrusion," the Court ac-
cordingly restated the first of the Coolidge plurality's requirements for
the proper application of the plain view exception.79 The Coolidge plu-
rality had held that the intrusion must precede the plain view observa-
tion; the Chrisman Court held that the evidence must be "discovered in
a place where the officer has a right to be."8 Chrisman is the United
States Supreme Court's most recent enunciation of the doctrine of post-
intrusion plain view.
III. OKLAHOMA DECISIONS
The first eight amendients to the United States Constitution do
not apply directly to the states. 8' However, many of the personal rights
safeguarded against federal action by those amendments are also safe-
76. We hold, therefore, that it is not "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment for
a police officer, as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person,
as his judgment dictates, following the arrest. The officer's need to ensure his own
safety-as well as the integrity of the arrest-is compelling. Such surveillance is not an
impermissible invasion of the privacy or personal liberty of an individual who has been
arrested.
Id at 7. In his dissenting opinion, Justice White countered: "I perceive no justification for what is
in effect aper se rule that an officer in [such] circumstances could always enter the room and stay
at the arrestee's elbow." Id at 14.
77. "It is of no legal significance whether the officer was in the room, on the threshold, or in
the hallway, since he had a right to be in any of these places as an incident of a valid arrest." Id
at 8 (emphasis added).
78. The "intrusion" in this case occurred when the officer, quite properly, followed
Overdahl into a private area to a point from which he had an unimpeded view of and
access to the area's contents and its occupants ....
...This is a classic instance of incriminating evidence found in plain view when a
police officer, for unrelated but entirely legitimate reasons, obtains lawful access to an
individual's area of privacy. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the seizure of
evidence of criminal conduct found in these circumstances.
Id at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
79. Id at 5-6; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
80. 455 U.S. at 6.
81. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 464, 468 (1833).
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guarded against state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8 2 The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is pro-
tected against state encroachment by the due process clause.8 3 The
Court also has ordered the states to follow all the "ins and outs" of its
fourth amendment decisions.8 4 As a result, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, as the court of last resort in Oklahoma criminal
cases," is bound by all United States Supreme Court decisions relating
to the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. While it is
debatable whether such specific federal guidelines make any less bur-
densome the state courts' task of deciding plain view exception cases,
those guidelines provide a clear standard for judging the merits of state
court decisions. Simply put, if an Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals decision conflicts with fourth amendment law as pronounced by
the United States Supreme Court, that Oklahoma decision is wrong.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire6 contains the Supreme Court's most
detailed treatment of the plain view exception. The Coolidge opinion
put forth three requirements for the proper application of the plain
view exception: (1) the mere observation of evidence in plain view can-
not justify a subsequent intrusion into a constitutionally protected area
of privacy; instead, the intrusion must precede the plain view observa-
tion; (2) the discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent; and (3) it
must be immediately apparent that the object seized is evidence of a
crime.8 7 In Washington v. Chrisman,88 the Court recently softened the
first of these requirements by holding that an intrusion occurs when the
police gain the right to enter an area of constitutionally protected pri-
82. The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." In resolving conflicting claims
concerning the meaning of this spacious language, the Court had looked increasingly to
the Bill of Rights for guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amend-
ments to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state action by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968); accord Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-
100 (1908) ("[lit is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but
because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law.").
83. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
84. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing
the ramifications of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)).
85. "The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be coextensive with the State and
shall extend to all cases at law and in equity, except that the Court of Criminal Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases .. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
86. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
87. Id at 466; see supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
88. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
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vacy rather than when the police physically enter the area. 9
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals seemingly espouses the
doctrine of post-intrusion plain view enunciated in Coolidge and Chris-
man. The Oklahoma court has frequently voiced its support of two of
the three requirements set forth in those cases-the requirement that
the discovery of the evidence in plain view be inadvertent 90 and the
requirement that it be immediately apparent that the object seized is
evidence of a crime.9 But the court has vacillated with regard to the
requirement that any intrusion into a constitutionally protected area of
privacy precede, rather than follow, the observation of evidence in
plain view. A comparison of the court's holdings in the cases of Clay-
ton v. State92 and Blackburn v. State93 illustrates its indecision.
In Clayton, a police officer entered a public recreation hall because
he smelled the odor of burning marijuana. The hall was open to the
public,94 so the police officer's entry was clearly not a search. 95 Inside
89. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
90. See Tucker v. State, 620 P.2d 1314, 1316-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) ("To justify seizure
of an object in plain view. . . the discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent."); Blackburn v.
State, 575 P.2d 638, 644 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) ([l~f law enforcement officials know in advance
what they are going to find, then they should get a search warrant."); Abbott v. State, 565 P.2d
691, 693 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) ("The second requirement, an inadvertent discovery, also ap-
pears to have been satisfied. The record indicates that the officers had no prior knowledge of the
existence or location of the [stolen automobile] eventually found on the defendant's property.");
Faulkner v. State, 554 P.2d 29, 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. at 466) ("Additionally, the observation of the [stolen property] was an inadvertent exten-
sion of [the police officer's valid] presence which made it 'immediately apparent to the police that
they [had] evidence before them'."); Morris v. State, 507 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973)
("[l]n Coolidge v. New Hampshire- . . the Supreme Court of the United States held that for the
'plain view' doctrine to apply, the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent and
that the discovery must not be anticipated." (citation omitted)).
91. See Jones v. State, 632 P.2d 1249, 1250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) ("[lit is equally true that
the. . . container was in plain view. However, under the facts herein presented, we are of the
opinion that there was no probable cause to believe that the content of the container was contra-
band. Consequently, its seizure and subsequent search was illegal."); Abbott v. State, 565 P.2d
691, 693 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) ("The third requirement, that the incriminating nature of the
object be immediately apparent, is supported by the evidence. The record reveals a sufficient
factual basis which would give the officers reasonable cause to believe the [car] was stolen.");
Kinsey v. State, 602 P.2d 240, 243 n.3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) ("ITIhe previously quoted testi-
mony indicates that the officers [seized] items they 'assumed' were stolen. To justify seizing an
object in 'plain view' it must be immediately apparent that it is evidence of a crime." (citation
omitted)); Satterlee v. State, 549 P.2d 104, 110 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) ("Therefore, Officer Mc-
Cullough, having personal knowledge of the robbery of Gates Pharmacy, had probable cause to
believe the objects observed within his plain view were fruits of the robbery and, thus, the objects
were reasonably and constitutionally subject to a warrantless plain view seizure."); State v. Baxter,
528 P.2d 347, 349 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) ("We find this an unreasonable seizure based upon the
officer's mere suspicion. . . that the bottle contained contraband .... .
92. 555 P.2d 1310 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
93. 575 P.2d 638 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
94. 555 P.2d at 1311.
95. See supra note 21.
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the hall, the officer encountered Clayton, who owned the hall, and
asked her, "Who's got the grass?"96 The public part of the hall was
separated from a private kitchen area by a door constructed so the top
half could be open while the bottom half was closed. The officer could
look through the open top half and see into the kitchen, but the bottom
half was closed to keep out the general public.97 Peering into the kitch-
en, the officer saw a small plastic bag filled with marijuana and Clay-
ton's purse lying on top of the cabinets. The officer opened the bottom
half of the door, entered the kitchen, and seized the purse and mari-
juana.98 He then returned to the public part of the hall and arrested
Clayton, who was later convicted of possession of a controlled sub-
stance after the bag of marijuana was admitted as evidence at her
trial.99 Upon appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld
the warrantless seizure of the bag of marijuana.'0° "This Court has
held on numerous occasions that property which an officer has prob-
able cause to believe is related to some crime may be seized if it is ob-
served by the officerfrom aposition that he has a lawful right to be in.' ' 1°
According to the Clayton court, the mere observation of evidence in
plain view justifies a subsequent intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
tected area of privacy.
Two years after the Clayton decision, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals was asked to determine the legitimacy of a warrant-
less seizure of evidence under circumstances similar to those encoun-
tered in Clayton. In Blackburn v. State, °2 a county sheriff standing in a
neighboring yard observed a large plastic-wrapped bundle of mari-
juana lying in plain view in appellants' back yard. 03 As in Clayton,
the lawfulness of the officer's vantage point was indisputable. Sus-
pecting that the appellants were selling marijuana, the owner of the
land from which the sheriff made his observations had alerted the sher-
iff and freely consented to the use of her land during the investiga-
tion. l When the sheriff saw the marijuana, he walked onto
appellants' private property and seized it as evidence. Meanwhile, the
96. 555 P.2d at 1311.
97. Id at 1312.
98. Id at 1311-12.
99. Id at 1311.
100. Id at 1312.
101. Id (emphasis added).
102. 575 P.2d 638 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
103. Id at 640.
104. Id The landowner, appellants' landlord, became suspicious when she noticed her tenants
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sheriff's deputies knocked on appellants' door and told them they were
under arrest. The seizure and arrests were made without a warrant. 0 5
Subsequently, the marijuana was admitted into evidence at the appel-
lants' trial 06 and they were convicted of possession of marijuana with
intent to sell. 10 7 As in Clayton, the evidence had been seized during a
police intrusion motivated by the observation of marijuana from a law-
ful vantage point. The Clayton court had ruled that the plain view ex-
ception justifies the warrantless seizure of evidence under such
circumstances.' But in Blackburn the court ignored its own Clayton
holding and held that the marijuana had been seized as the result of an
unlawful police intrusion and therefore was inadmissible as evi-
dence.0 9 Citing Coolidge, the court explained that "the fact that an
object is in plain view is never by itself a justification for a warrantless
seizure";' 0 the observation of evidence in plain view from a lawful
vantage point does not justify a subsequent intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area of privacy. The court seemingly overruled Clay-
ton, sub silentio, by expressly rejecting the state's argument that since
the sheriff "was where he had a legal right to be when he saw the mari-
huana. .. he was justified in seizing the marihuana as contraband in
plain view."" '
The Clayton and Blackburn holdings are contradictory; they can-
not coexist. Blackburn came after Clayton, and one might have as-
sumed that Blackburn signaled the end of Clayton's influence. But the
cat is in danger of being swallowed by the canary, for the vitality of
Clayton continues so unabated that one must presume it is Blackburn's
influence that has waned. In 1981, three years after Blackburn was de-
cided, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals cited Clayton as sup-
port for the proposition that "[ilt is well settled that evidence observed
within the plain view of an officer from a position that he has a lawful
right to be in, is subject to search and seizure."' 1 2 Even more recently,
had numerous visitors who only stayed for five or ten minutes. On one occasion she saw a box
filled with "dark-colored dried leaves" in appellants' yard. Id
105. Id
106. d at 641.
107. Id at 639.
108. See supra text accompanying note 101.
109. 575 P.2d at 643-44. The court also ruled that the discovery of the bundle of marijuana
was not inadvertent. Id
110. 575 P.2d at 643-44.
111. Id at 643.
112. Swam v. State, 637 P.2d 888, 890 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (court held there was no
unreasonable search or seizure when police officer poked his head through curtains of peep show
booth in pornographic book store after hearing suspicious sounds coming from inside).
[Vol. 18:674
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the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that "[tlo justify a
seizure of an object in plain view . . . the officer must have a prior
justification for his presence and a lawful right to be there .... ,113
The exact meaning of such a requirement is obscure" 4 until one notes
the court's reliance upon Clayton as the sole precedent for its pro-
nouncement." 5  Clearly, Clayton has survived Blackburn."6  As a re-
sult, the Oklahoma court's position as to whether the mere observation
of evidence in plain view justifies a subsequent police intrusion remains
inconsistent.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals-in strict accordance
with the United States Supreme Court's decisions-has ruled that the
plain view exception justifies a warrantless seizure only when the dis-
covery of the evidence is inadvertent and it is immediately apparent
that the object seized is evidence of a crime.' 17 Because the Oklahoma
court's contradictory decisions in Clayton and Blackburn make it un-
clear whether the mere observation of evidence in plain view justifies a
subsequent warrantless intrusion upon a suspect's privacy, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals must repudiate either Clayton or
Blackburn if Oklahoma plain view law is to be made consistent and,
consequently, predictable. Like all state courts, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals is bound by the plain view opinions handed down by
the United States Supreme Court.' 8 The Oklahoma decision that con-
flicts with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court is an improper
expression of plain view law. Clayton is that conflicting decision.
113. Brown v. State, 644 P.2d 566, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (quoting Tucker v. State, 620
P.2d 1314, 1316-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980)) (court upheld constitutionality of seizure of gun and
note observed by police during arrest of suspect in his home).
114. The confusion stems from the court's use of the ambiguous phrase "right to be there."
Under Clayton, the police officer must merely have a right to be at whatever vantage point offers
him a view of the evidence to be seized. See supra text accompanying note 101. Under Black-
burn, the officer must also have the right to be in the immediate area occupied by the evidence to
be seized. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11. Therefore, it is not clear from the quoted
passage whether the court is citing the Clayton rule or the Blackburn rule, since it is unclear what
the court means by "there."
115. 644 P.2d at 568.
116. The continuing influence of Clayton is apparent in one Oklahoma commentator's one-
sentence formulation of the plain view exception: "Houses, vehicles or other property always may
be searched without a warrant when an officer is observing or searching from a position that he
has a lawful right to be in." Turpen, The Law of Warrantless Search and Seizure (pt. 2), 51 OKLA.
B.J. 1007, 1007 (1980) (emphasis in original).
117. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971); see supra notes 71-72.
118. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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The Clayton court cited three cases as authority for its holding that
the mere observation of evidence in plain view justifies a subsequent
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area of privacy:' " 9 Harris v.
United States, 2 ' a United States Supreme Court decision; Ferguson v.
State'12 and Turci v. State, 22 both Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals decisions. A careful reading of these three cases disproves their
fitness as precedent for the Clayton holding for each is easily distin-
guished from Clayton.
In Clayton, a police officer intruded into a private kitchen in order
to seize a bag of marijuana he had observed from a public area. 2 3 The
intrusion followed the plain view observation. In contrast, the police
officer in Harris intruded into the suspect's car in order to roll up the
car windows and only then discovered the registration card lying on the
doorsill. 24 The intrusion preceded the plain view observation.
Clearly, the two cases are distinguished by their facts. However, the
Harris opinion contains language which could be misconstrued to sup-
port the Clayton holding. In announcing its holding, the Harris Court
said, "[O]bjects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
introduced into evidence."" 5 The Clayton court announced its holding
in similar language, "[P]roperty which an officer has probable cause to
believe is related to some crime may be seized f it is observed by the
oficer from a position that he has a lawful right to be in."'' 2 6
But the factual differences that distinguish Harris from Clayton
make it clear that this similarity in language masks an underlying dif-
ference in judicial philosophies. When the Harris Court refers to "an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view," it refers
to a policeman who already has lawfully intruded into a suspect's car
for the purpose of closing its windows against a falling rain. The plain
view observation followed a lawful intrusion. l 7 But when the Clayton
119. 555 P.2d at 1312.
120. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
121. 520 P.2d 819 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
122. 482 P.2d 611 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
123. 555 P.2d at 1311-12.
124. 390 U.S. at 235-36.
125. Id at 236 (emphasis added).
126. 555 P.2d at 1312 (emphasis added).
127. "Harris did not rely on the plain view doctrine to justify the warrantless intrusion into the
automobile. The Court emphasized that the police officer had already lawfully entered the car
when he saw incriminating evidence in plain view inside the car and seized it. . . ." Washington
v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 12 n.4 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 18:674
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court refers to an officer occupying "a position that he has a lawful
right to be in," it refers to an officer about to unlatch a door and in-
trude into a private kitchen area for the sole purpose of seizing a bag of
marijuana. The plain view observation preceded the intrusion. When
the Clayton court relies upon Harris, it relies upon only the single sen-
tence from that opinion that is quoted above and then construes the
meaning of that single sentence without proper regard for the facts to
which it originally applied. The Clayton court relies upon the lan-
guage, rather than the law, of Harris.
Similarly, neither Ferguson 28 nor Turi129 can withstand scrutiny
as suitable precedent for the Clayton holding. Whereas Harris and
Clayton are distinguishable upon their facts, both Ferguson and Turci
are easily distinguished from Clayton upon matters of law. Ferguson
and Turd involve applications of the doctrine of pre-intrusion plain
view.' 30 That doctrine dictates only that the mere observation of evi-
dence in plain view does not constitute an intrusion upon the suspect's
privacy.' Application of the doctrine of pre-intrusion plain view to
the facts of Clayton yields only the conclusion that there was no police
intrusion when the officer observed the bag of marijuana lying on the
kitchen cabinet. It does not yield the conclusion reached by the Clay-
ton court that the mere observation of the marijuana permitted the of-
ficer to enter the private kitchen area in order to seize it as evidence.
The doctrine of pre-intrusion plain view addresses the question of
whether a police intrusion has occurred. Once the court determines
that a police intrusion has occurred, the doctrine of pre-intrusion plain
view can serve no further purpose. The intrusion in Clayton occurred
when the officer opened the door and entered the private kitchen area.
Pre-intrusion plain view law is therefore not applicable.
While the Clayton court erroneously relied upon Harris, Ferguson,
and Turci as support for its holding, it ignored Coolidge v. New Hamp-
128. 520 P.2d 819 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
129. 482 P.2d 611 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
130. In both cases, a police officer standing alongside a vehicle he had stopped for a traffic
violation observed conspicuously unconcealed incriminating evidence within the vehicle. Both
courts held that the mere observation of evidence in plain view does not constitute an intrusion
upon the suspect's privacy but may supply probable cause for such an intrusion under the vehicle
exception to the warrant requirement, Ferguson, 520 P.2d at 819-20, or the search incident excep-
tion, Turci, 482 P.2d at 612-13. Neither court invoked the plain view exception.
131. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. Explaining its holding, the Clayton court
reasoned that evidence seized after being "observed by the officer from a position that he has a




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss4/6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
shire,'3 2 the leading United States Supreme Court post-intrusion plain
view case. 13 3 Justice Bussey, the author of Clayton and a dissenter in
Blackburn, later explained this disregard for Coolidge.
I believe the holding in Blackburn was based upon an incor-
rect interpretation of prior case law, particularly Coolidge v.
New Hampshire. .. . Dicta in that opinion, supported by
only four members of the court, was interpreted by the major-
ity of this Court as purporting to limit the plain view excep-
tion to the securing of a search warrant to situations in which
exigent circumstances existed independent of the plain view.
However, I believe this is not the prevailing precedent nor the
law in Oklahoma. The most recent controlling statement by
the United States Supreme Court concerning the doctrine of
plain view is found in Harris v. United States .... 134
Considering the complexity of the alignment of justices in the Coolidge
decision,131 Justice Bussey's curt dismissal of the plurality's opinion as
something less than controlling authority is an oversimplification.
Assuming, arguendo, that Justice Bussey's assessment of the prece-
dential weight due the Coolidge plurality opinion was justified when he
made the above remarks, the esteem accorded Coolidge in Blackburn
has since been vindicated by the United States Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Washington v. Chrisman.36 In that case, a clear majority of the
Court reiterated the Coolidge plurality's dictate that the mere observa-
tion of evidence in plain view cannot justify a warrantless intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area of privacy. 137 The Coolidge plu-
rality told police officers under what circumstances they cannot law-
fully intrude into a constitutionally protected area of privacy to make a
warrantless seizure:
[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless
seizure of evidence. . . . Incontrovertible testimony of the
senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging
to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible meas-
ure of probable cause. But even where the object is contra-
band, the Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic
rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless
132. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
133. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
134. Phelps v. State, 598 P.2d 254, 262 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (Bussey, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
135. See supra notes 46 & 62.
136. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
137. See supra notes 64 & 78.
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seizure. 138
The Chrisman majority, in contrast, told police officers when they have
intruded into a constitutionally protected area of privacy and conse-
quently may make valid warrantless seizures: "The 'plain view' excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permits a law
enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or
contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right
to be." ' 39 Therefore, the Clayton court contradicted both Coolidge and
Chrisman when it held that the plain view exception permits a police
officer to enter a private kitchen area to make a warrantless seizure of
marijuana observed from a public area. Applying the Coolidge ap-
proach, the police officer's observation of the marijuana was not
enough by itself to justify the warrantless entry into the kitchen. Ap-
plying the Chrisman approach, the marijuana was not discovered in a
place where the officer had a right to be; therefore, his observation of
the marijuana did not by itself give him the right to enter the kitchen.
In Clayton, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was forced
to distort the doctrine of post-intrusion plain view in order to justify the
police officer's intrusion. The approach taken by the court seems to
indicate that it assumed that the police officer's intrusion into the kitch-
en could be justified only under the plain view exception. But the pos-
sibilities of fourth amendment law are not so limited. One search or
seizure may be justified by several different exceptions to the warrant
requirement. The court should have realized that whether or not the
officer's intrusion was justified under the plain view exception, it was
probably justified under another exception-the hot pursuit exception.
Under the hot pursuit exception, a police officer may make a war-
rantless intrusion into a constitutionally protected area of privacy if
two conditions are met: (1) the officer has probable cause to believe that
evidence of a crime is contained within that area and (2) the intrusion
is necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence or the risk of harm
either to the officer or the general public."4 In Clayton, the police of-
138. 403 U.S. at 468 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
139. 455 U.S. at 5-6.
140. See supra note 19. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has frequently applied the
hot pursuit exception to justify a warrantless intrusion into a constitutionally protected area of
privacy. Eg., Chancy v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 277 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) ("If the time required to
secure a warrant could result in the loss of evidence, the escape of a suspect, or above all the death
of a victim, then law enforcement officials may act without a warrant if probable cause exists.");
Johnson v. State, 554 P.2d 51, 54 (Okla. Crim. App.) (court upheld warrantless search of suspect's
car trunk because police believed it contained a kidnapping victim), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943
(1976); see also Sitsler v. State, 603 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) ("We. . .cannot
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ficer had probable cause to believe that there was marijuana in the
kitchen; he had the testimony of his own senses to that effect. It was
also likely that Clayton would have destroyed or removed the mari-
juana if the officer had left the recreation hall to seek a warrant. Once
the officer had asked Clayton, "Who's got the grass?,"' 4 1 it is very likely
that she would have availed herself of any opportunity to dispose of the
marijuana before the officer could seize it. Therefore, the officer's in-
trusion into the kitchen to seize the bag of marijuana was probably
justified under the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement. It
is also instructive to note that the warrantless police intrusion in Black-
burn was not justified under the hot pursuit exception. In Blackburn,
the appellants had no knowledge or warning that the police suspected
them of possessing and selling marijuana. The sheriff could have left
his vantage point and sought a warrant without seriously risking de-
struction or removal of the evidence. The Blackburn court, in fact,
took express notice of the inapplicability of the hot pursuit exception
under such circumstances. 142
The applicability of the hot pursuit exception to the facts of Clay-
ton coupled with its inapplicability to those of Blackburn suggests that
the two contradictory plain view cases can be reconciled, though not as
two plain view decisions. Rather Clayton should be recognized as a hot
pursuit decision and Blackburn as a true plain view decision. By
adopting Clayton as a hot pursuit case rather than a plain view case, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would resolve the inconsistency
it engendered through its contradictory pronouncements of plain view
law in the two cases. The court should take the approach that the result
reached in Clayton is correct and the bag of marijuana was lawfully
seized without a warrant, but that the process of reasoning which led to
that result was faulty. There is no need to overrule Clayton, only to
repudiate it as an expression of Oklahoma plain view law. That repu-
conclude that a warrantless search was justified on the ground that it was impractical to obtain a
warrant.").
141. 555 P.2d at 1311.
142. [The sheriff] passed up two opportunities to obtain a search warrant. He could have
obtained one before he went to the defendants' residence; and failing that, he could have
returned to town to obtain a search warrant after verifying the presence of contraband.
When he went to the defendants' residence he was accompanied by three deputies. They
could have stayed to watch the premises while he returned to town if the defendants had
attempted to destroy the marijuana, or to flee, in that case there would have been exigent
circumstances justifying an immediate entry onto the property.
575 P.2d at 643.
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diation will bring consistency and predictability to the doctrine of post-
intrusion plain view in Oklahoma.
V. CONCLUSION
According to the United States Supreme Court, the plain view ex-
ception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement permits a police
officer to seize incriminating evidence when three requirements are
met: (1) the evidence is discovered in a place where the officer already
has a right to be; (2) it is immediately apparent that the object seized is
evidence of a crime; and (3) the discovery of the evidence is inadver-
tent. 43 In Oklahoma, the second and third requirements must be met
for a valid plain view seizure. But in Clayton, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals ruled that the plain view exception permits a police
officer to intrude into a place where he has no right to be in order to
seize evidence discovered in plain view.'" The Oklahoma court contin-
ues to cite Clayton with approval;' 45 it cannot be dismissed as an iso-
lated case or a momentary aberration. In the interest of reconciling
Oklahoma law with the law of the land as enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
should repudiate Clayton as an expression of Oklahoma plain view
law.
Dale . Gilsinger
143. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
145. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
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